Theoretical and Methodological Challenges of Using Game Theory in Modeling Political Processes
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31861/mediaforum.2025.16.308-319Keywords:
game theory, political processes, multiple equilibria, empirical relevance, institutional context, rational choice, incomplete informationAbstract
This article examines the primary theoretical and methodological challenges of using game theory to study political processes. Special attention is paid to the issues of multiple equilibria, increasing model “baroqueness,” and difficulties in empirical verification. The analysis also addresses the role of institutional factors and incomplete information, which complicate the formalization and prediction of political behavior. The paper juxtaposes the critical viewpoints of Pierre Allan and Cédric Dupont, Donald Green, and Ian Shapiro with the approaches of Catherine Langlois and Gerardo Munck, who propose new ways to integrate formal rigor with empirical relevance. Particular emphasis is placed on how bounded rationality, cultural factors, and institutional frameworks influence the modeling of both domestic and international political processes.
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