The Evolution of the U.S. Special Operations Mechanism as a Form of Foreign Policy Activity

Abstract

The article examines the evolution of the United States’ special operations mechanism as an instrument of foreign policy after the period of its intensive use in Latin America in the 1980s. The mechanism is understood as a set of institutions (above all the U.S. Special Operations Command, USSOCOM, and its regional headquarters), doctrinal approaches (foreign internal defense; counterterrorism; irregular warfare), legal regimes, and procedures of democratic oversight that shape the feasibility of “light-footprint,” “managed escalation,” and partner-based campaigning strategies. The study shows that, following the Latin American experience, three key transformations occurred:

(1) institutional strengthening through the creation of a centralized system for the command, management, and development of special operations forces;

(2) doctrinal shifts from partnership missions to “networked” counterterrorism and a subsequent return to the concept of irregular warfare in the context of great-power strategic competition;

(3) tighter legal and reputational constraints, including procedures related to covert action and the vetting of foreign military units under the so-called Leahy Laws.

The findings highlight which principles of this American evolution may be useful for Ukraine: institutional maturity of the Special Operations Forces, interagency integration of the “data–decision–action” cycle, and a focus on the long-term effects of resilience.