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## THE SAUDI-ISRAELI CONFLICT: CURRENT STATE AND SETTLEMENT SCENARIO

*The article analyses the origins and the real state of Saudi-Israeli relations, outlines possible scenarios for resolving the Saudi-Israeli conflict. It is shown that the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Israel has deep historical roots and a complex structure. The main reason for the conflict and disagreements is the Palestinian issue, the resolution of which Saudi Arabia constantly keeps in view, defending the rights of the Palestinian people and insisting on the creation of an independent state.*

180 — *A SWOT-analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of current Saudi-Israeli relations showed that their normalization has significant potential for positive changes in economic, political, and security spheres. Opportunities for improving relations include attracting European investments, which may be caused by the positive reaction of the international community to the normalization of relations.*

*With the help of the scenario method, an attempt was made to predict three future scenarios for the development of Saudi-Israeli relations: an optimistic one – full normalization of relations, which may take place with the mediation and support of the USA; a pessimistic scenario, according to which normalization is expected to be undermined by Iran's intervention, the Islamic Republic is trying to create an axis of evil that will oppose the Western world, especially the USA; a realistic scenario, when normalization may have a formal character, that is, minimal diplomatic efforts are made by both countries, partial normalization of relations takes place, including economic cooperation and security guarantees.*

**Keywords:** Saudi Arabia, Israel, USA, Palestinian issue, Saudi-Israeli conflict, conflict resolution scenarios, «Saudi Vision 2030».

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### **Саудівсько-ізраїльський конфлікт: сучасний стан та сценарії врегулювання**

У статті проаналізовано витоки і реальний стан саудівсько-ізраїльських відносин, окреслено можливі сценарії вирішення саудівсько-ізраїльського конфлікту. Показано, що конфлікт між Саудівською Аравією та Ізраїлем має глибоке історичне коріння та складну структуру. Основною причиною конфлікту та розбіжностей є палестинське питання, вирішення якого Саудівська Аравія постійного тримає в полі зору, захищаючи права палестинського народу та наполягаючи на створенні незалежної держави. Окремо вказано, що геополітичне суперництво між державами, їхні різні союзи та альянси, а також економічна конкуренція за вплив у регіоні додатково ускладнюють взаємодію між Саудівською Аравією та Ізраїлем. Історичні фактори, такі як арабо-ізраїльські війни та незавершені мирні ініціативи, продовжують бути причиною суперечок на шляху до стабільних відносин.

Наголошується, що в ході дипломатичних маневрів Сполучених Штатів було докладено значних зусиль для пожвавлення діалогу щодо нормалізації відносин між Саудівською Аравією та Ізраїлем. Та, не слід ігнорувати виклики в саудівсько-ізраїльських відносинах, враховуючи потенційну негативну реакцію з боку саудівського суспільства та інших арабських країн через емоційні та історичні зв'язки з палестинським питанням.

SWOT-аналіз сильних і слабких сторін сучасних саудівсько-ізраїльських відносин засвідчив, що їхня нормалізація має значний потенціал до позитивних змін, як в економічній, політичній, так і в безпековій сферах. Можливості для покращення відносин включають залучення європейських інвестицій, що може бути спричинене позитивною реакцією міжнародної спільноти на нормалізацію відносин.

За допомогою сценарного методу зроблено спробу передбачити три майбутні сценарії розвитку саудівсько-ізраїльських відносин: оптимістичний – повна нормалізація відносин, що може відбутись за посередництва та підтримки США; песимістичний сценарій, за яким передбачається підірвати нормалізацію втручанням Ірану, Ісламська Республіка намагається створити вісь зла, що протистоятиме західному світу, особливо США; реалістичний сценарій, коли нормалізація може мати формальний характер, тобто докладається мінімум дипломатичних зусиль обох країн, відбувається часткова

нормалізація відносин, що включає економічну співпрацю та гарантії безпеки.

**Ключові слова:** Саудівська Аравія, Ізраїль, США, палестинське питання, саудівсько-ізраїльський конфлікт, сценарії врегулювання конфлікту, «Візія 2030».

**Introduction.** Research interest in the problems of the Persian Gulf region today is not decreasing but, on the contrary, is growing, considering the unchanged strategic significance of its energy attractions and geopolitical opportunities. Accordingly, the relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, key players in the region, are especially significant for the world, and especially for the United States of America.

The normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations affects not only the geopolitical reality but is also extremely necessary in the development and implementation of new strategies for regional stability and security. The resolution of the conflict, especially in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, will significantly limit the influence of extremist organizations and reduce tension in the region, which will contribute to development and security. Based on global trends in international relations regarding the change in the configuration and conditions of the formation of strategic alliances and the role of key players, this may create new opportunities for the normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations. The development and evaluation of future scenarios for the settlement of these relations will contribute to stability in the Middle East, economic growth and security in the region, open new opportunities for trade and cooperation in the world, and attract global players to solving regional problems, which will contribute to the formation of new strategic alliances.

**Problem statement.** This problem causes considerable interest in broad global academic circles. Thus, it is worth mentioning I. Atta (Atta 2023), who studies the U.S. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf region. A. Jacobs (Jacobs 2023), an expert on the countries of the Persian Gulf, a researcher of changes in modern Saudi Arabian politics. E. Podeh (Podeh 2018) is a professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, a specialist in Islamic and Middle Eastern history and the causes of conflicts in the Middle East. A. Khalfa (Khalfa 2024), who explores the evolution of Saudi-Israeli relations through the transition from quiet diplomacy to full normalization. C. Cooper (Cooper 2024) is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council's Middle East Programs and is the founder of Guard Hill House,

LLC, a national security and sustainable infrastructure consultancy, who believes that the future of Saudi-Israeli relations is balancing between Palestinian and regional interests. That is why it is timely to propose possible scenarios for the development of the Saudi-Israeli conflict and to evaluate them.

**The purpose of the research** is to propose effective strategies and possible scenarios for its resolution, based on the main reasons and obstacles to overcoming the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

**Presentation of the main material.** The aggressive, often reckless, regional policy of Riyadh has begun to change since 2020 (Atta 2023). These changes were caused, not least, by the Trump administration's refusal to punish Iran for the drone strikes on the Abqaiq Aramco oil refinery in 2019 (Jacobs 2023). The United States reluctance to help the kingdom seriously influenced the views of the King of Saudi Arabia regarding the desire to change the country's foreign policy (Borger, 2019) by expanding international ties and contacts.

The essence of this policy lies in the focus on achieving economic indicators corresponding to global energy development and maximum independence. This focus, in part, helped the kingdom increase its gross domestic product to a historic figure of one trillion dollars in 2022.

Changes in the strategic course of Saudi Arabia were initiated by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is strengthening his influence by minimizing dependence on hydrocarbon exports and expanding geopolitical scope through active diplomacy and mediation initiatives.

To properly assess the latest foreign policy innovations of Saudi Arabia, they should be considered through the lens of «Saudi Vision 2030,» the main strategic development initiative of the state, proposed by the Crown Prince in 2016. Its main goal is to improve Saudi Arabia's position in the global transition to clean energy through economic diversification (Jacobs 2023).

Overall, the implementation of the strategic initiative «Saudi Vision 2030» became a response to the challenges and opportunities (Saudi Vision 2030, 2016) that the kingdom faces during regional instability. Saudi Arabia is diversifying its foreign policy to reduce regional tensions, expand cooperation with key countries, and use foreign policy initiatives to reduce security risks and support its economic strategies. By implementing a pragmatic foreign policy, Riyadh seeks to adapt to the changing world order, minimize threats to its security, and achieve its ambitious goals

defined within the framework of «Saudi Vision 2030». This transition is an important step for the Kingdom, which strives to ensure stability and prosperity in a complex and globalized world.

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel have a rather extensive history and originate from the moment of the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. This became a subject of tension in the relations between many Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, which refused to recognize Israel and supported the Palestinian resistance.

Over the decades, these relations have gone through various phases from tension to the establishment of certain forms of cooperation at various political and state levels (Podeh 2018). The Saudis, like most Arabs, did not support the creation of a Jewish state in the center of the Arab world. But unlike other Arab states such as Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, Saudi Arabia in the Arab-Israeli conflict was not aggressive and mainly used diplomatic and financial methods, without resorting to military ones.

184 — In connection with events, particularly after the Gulf War of 1990-1991, when Saudi Arabia and Israel cooperated on some strategic issues, some representatives of both countries began to consider the possibility of improving relations. The agreement known as Oslo -1, concluded in 1993 between Israel and the Palestinian Organization and aimed at resolving the conflict in the Middle East, is considered one of the first attempts at establishing a peace process between Israel and the Palestinians and one that contributed to more active behind-the-scenes contacts with Saudi Arabia (Kostiner 2009).

The public rapprochement of Saudi Arabia with Israel occurred gradually and intensified with the arrival of Donald Trump to power (Khalfa 2024). In 2015, both countries acknowledged that they had secret meetings to discuss Iran's ambitions in the region. However, there remained differences in Israel's attitude toward the Palestinians.

At the beginning of 2021, it became known that the Joe Biden administration intended to agree by the end of 2023 on the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. This was to crown the Abraham Accords of Donald Trump, concluded in 2020 between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. These historic agreements, which emphasized support for Israel's sovereignty, would open a new perspective for regional stability and economic development and are an important step in strengthening peace and cooperation in the region (Cooper 2024).

In the summer of 2023, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States, Princess Reema, expressed Saudi Arabia's view on relations between Israel and Palestine, noting that Saudi Arabia seeks not only normalization but also integration with Israel (Weiss 2023). The statement emphasized that achieving peace between Israel and Palestine aligns with the ambitious social reforms of «Saudi Vision 2030» and that Saudi Arabia sees shared prosperity for two independent states – Israel and Palestine (Cooper 2024).

Saudi Arabia emphasized the need to advance the issue of the creation of two states, which in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a key condition for the normalization of relations. However, the Abraham Accords concluded by the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan in 2020 did not contain a condition regarding regional progress in the creation of a Palestinian state (Cooper 2024).

Saudi Arabia has never perceived Israel as a threat to its survival. The main problem for the Saudi elites was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict for revolutionary regimes in the region for a long time was an opportunity to embed themselves in Middle Eastern societies and gain influence there. And indeed, the liberation of Palestine is the main, if not the only, reason on which most of the Arab world is unanimous. Each subsequent aggression of Israel toward the Palestinians shakes the very foundation of Muslim and, especially, Arab society (Khalfa 2024).

However, the dynamics of the relationship changed after the events of October 7, 2023, when Hamas carried out a military intervention in Israel, to which Israel, in response, may launch a full-scale military invasion of the city of Rafah, located in the Gaza Strip.

As a precondition for escalation, most analytical centers and media consider the potential agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel (Alrebh 2023). According to M. Levitt, a researcher at the Washington Institute, the factor that prompted the Hamas leadership to carry out a serious escalation attack was primarily the goal of hindering the diplomatic efforts of Israel and Saudi Arabia. Hamas is convinced that such a normalization agreement would remove the Palestinian issue from the agenda of most Arab and Islamic countries. Moreover, the expected normalization could strengthen an effective regional alliance against Iran and its allies, including HAMAS and Hezbollah (Levitt 2023).

Saudi Arabia's attitude toward the current war, in their opinion, is balanced. The government of Saudi Arabia strongly condemned the large-

scale attack, and the siege of Gaza carried out by Israel in response to October 7. The Saudi side conveyed its dissatisfaction to the United States. This indicates that the kingdom, along with other Arab countries, affirms its Muslim identity and demonstrates the commitment of the main country of the Arabian Peninsula to the Palestinian issue (Khalifa 2024).

In 2024, it became known that despite the increasing capabilities of Hamas's intervention and Israel's military response to the invasion, the leaders in Riyadh, Tel Aviv, and Washington remain unanimous regarding the relevance of normalizing relations (Gritten 2024). That is, this issue remains on the agenda, and discussions about the war in Gaza, the release of hostages, the provision of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip, and the reduction of regional tension continue. This has a significant impact on the relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

However, the main focus is on the threats from Iran and its allies, as well as on the interest in creating a Palestinian state. Although Saudi Arabia's position is not new, the discussion of Palestinian statehood is gaining importance during the negotiations on a ceasefire and the reconstruction of Gaza after the conflict is resolved (Cooper 2024).

If we analyze Israel's position regarding potential normalization negotiations, the ruling coalition in Israel is considered the most conservative in the country's history (Maksad 2024). Israel cannot form a coalition necessary for the nation's prosperity, because it would lead to the collapse of the ruling coalition, which Netanyahu needs to survive politically (Friedman, 2024). This complicates any negotiations and agreement-making. Israel remains in a state of conflict with HAMAS, which many Israelis perceive as an existing threat, while Palestinians are in a state of despair due to internal divisions (Maksad 2024).

The time for an agreement between the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Israel had a potential limitation in the form of the United State presidential elections. Netanyahu may have believed that the wisest decision would be to wait for Donald Trump's return to the presidency, who would offer unconditional support to him and his main coalition allies. However, whether such a scenario will be realized is still unclear.

And it may well happen that Israel will deeply regret the lost opportunity which is due to the missed chance for significant regional changes, which were not without complex challenges, but could have been not the worst alternative for Israel in a state of crisis (Horovitz 2024).

As early as May 2024, the Americans stated that Israel is not ready to recognize Palestine, and that Israel may not want to accept a normalization deal with Saudi Arabia if it means agreeing to progress in creating a Palestinian state.

Under such conditions, it is unlikely that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be ready to agree to Saudi Arabia's demands for normalization, particularly a prolonged ceasefire in Gaza and recognition of the irreversible path toward the creation of a Palestinian state (Maksad 2024). However, after Iran's attack on Israel on April 13, 2024, using drones and missiles, Israel seemed to recognize that the best way to counter the threat posed by Iran and its proxies is to work with a coalition not only of allied Western countries but also with Arab countries. The idea that Americans, Europeans, and Arabs would unite to help intercept drones and cruise missiles launched by Iran against Israel would have recently seemed like a fantasy – and, for Israel, an undesirable one. The Israeli defense slogan has always been: «We defend ourselves».

But now, when Israel faces not only Iran but also several Iranian proxy groups, the cost of acting alone on all these fronts becomes too high. This turn of events, along with the willingness shown by Arab countries in April 2024 to join Israel in confronting the threat posed by Iran and its henchmen, suggests that a window has opened to create a regional coalition conducting a joint strategy to counter Iran and its proxy groups.

However, to seize this opportunity, Israel, the United States, and the Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, must realize the uniqueness of the moment and make use of it. A breakthrough, mediated by the U.S., in a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia would do a lot to strengthen the new coalition.

The process of normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel is a large, complex task that involves constant variables. As the evolution of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel shows various stages, from tense relations to some cooperation in different areas such as security and energy, these relations develop under the influence of geopolitical factors and the strategic interests of both states.

Given the circumstances that have developed in the relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, the latter is acting on two fronts: strengthening its own military potential and actively expanding economic and military ties with leading international partners. The Kingdom seeks to strengthen defense ties with European countries, as well as with China, India, Brazil,

South Africa, and Turkey, to compensate for the decreasing support from the United States in the field of security (Huggard & Natan 2020).

However, considering that the Palestinian issue is critically important for the leading Arab-Muslim country, Riyadh must strategically calculate its actions regarding any internal, regional, or international issues that may affect it or fall under its influence. At the same time, the United States remains the main supplier of weapons and military technologies for Saudi Arabia, which is crucial for maintaining regional stability and deterring Iran and its allies.

Thus, as a mediator of any realistic Saudi-Israeli deal, Washington must make every effort to satisfy Riyadh's demands regarding weapons and technologies, if both regional allies agree to sit down at the negotiating table to discuss a peace agreement in the future. The U.S.- Saudi defense treaty and nuclear partnership, along with Israeli-Saudi normalization, could trigger a strategic revolution in the Middle East and ensure the kingdom's long-term security and prosperity.

188

— To propose scenarios for the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, we will attempt to comprehensively assess the current situation in Saudi-Israeli relations using a SWOT analysis.

Thus, the SWOT analysis shows that the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel has significant potential for positive changes in the economic, political, and security spheres. Opportunities for improving relations include attracting European investments, which may be caused by the positive reaction of the international community to the normalization of relations. Particularly positive in this context is the fact that for Riyadh this is a beneficial option, due to the kingdom's desire to diversify its economy under the strategic initiative "Saudi Vision 2030." The agreement on normalization of relations would be resonant not only in the region but also globally. However, this process faces numerous challenges and threats associated with external influence, terrorism, and geopolitical changes, which require special attention and careful management.

The scenario method, used to predict future events, can be applied for practical analysis, as it allows consideration of various development paths of Saudi-Israeli relations and preparation of strategies for each scenario. This will allow a better understanding of potential risks and opportunities, as well as preparation for different variants of the development of the situation.

*Optimistic scenario.* Full normalization of relations, which may occur

through the mediation and support of the United States. Washington actively supports the normalization process, providing diplomatic and economic support to both countries. The agreement may include significant economic investments, energy projects, and cooperation in the field of security. Signing a security guarantee agreement between the USA and Saudi Arabia and its ratification by the US Senate may improve bilateral relations and activate cooperation in the field of security. Israel, in turn, may stop its plans for a full-scale offensive on the city of Rafah and grant privileges to the Palestinian people. However, it is unlikely that the discussion would be about the existence of Palestine as a state. As a result of the implementation of this scenario, regional stability may improve, economic growth will occur in both countries, and the positions of the USA in the region will be strengthened.

Figure 1

**SWOT Analysis of the current situation of Saudi – Israeli relations**

Strengths	Weaknesses
<p>International support: involvement of international mediators and partners can contribute to finding a compromise and establishing further cooperation.</p> <p>Regional stability: improvement of relations will promote stability and reduce tensions in the Middle East region.</p> <p>Signing agreements between Saudi Arabia and the USA and between Saudi Arabia and Israel: it gives the Kingdom the opportunity to obtain security guarantees and assistance in the development of a civilian nuclear program, while Israel as a state can receive recognition from the main Arab country.</p> <p>Establishment and activation of bilateral relations between the USA and Saudi Arabia: after a period of cold relations, such an agreement is an opportunity to improve bilateral dialogue between Riyadh and Washington.</p>	<p>Historical contradictions: historical differences and conflicts between Arab countries and Israel, including the issue of Palestinian territories, complicate the conditions for normalization of relations. These conflicts cause mistrust and hinder the establishment of full diplomatic relations.</p> <p>Internal political differences: strong anti-Israeli sentiments among part of the population of Saudi Arabia and the Muslim world as a whole burden the normalization process. In turn, against the background of the Hamas attack on Israel, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu and the people in general perceive the Muslim world as hostile. Internal political fragmentation and differing views significantly affect the issue of normalization with Arab countries.</p> <p>The concluded agreement may be formal: normalization of relations between Tehran and Riyadh is a vivid example when both countries maintain “fragile” relations through minimal diplomatic steps. This could also happen because Saudi Arabia will seek to balance relations with Iran amid normalization with Israel, in order to avoid bilateral conflict and regional tension.</p> <p>Instability in the region: the presence of conflicts and tensions in the Middle East region may complicate the process of resolving relations with Israel.</p>

Opportunities	Threats
<p>Development of economic potential: joint economic projects can promote new opportunities in technology, energy, tourism, etc. This can also lead to the creation and development of new markets and opportunities for both countries.</p> <p>Creation of a coalition to counter Iran and its proxy groups: the United States, through this agreement, can involve one of the main Muslim states in a coalition to counter Iran and its regional players, which undermine stability not only in the region but also globally.</p> <p>Cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel in the field of security: the need to resolve security issues in the region regarding the activities of various terrorist groups will help combine joint efforts. Since Israel and Saudi Arabia have common interests in security, the fight against terrorism, and regional stabilization.</p> <p>Attraction of investments from European countries into Saudi Arabia and Israel: establishing diplomatic relations between both countries can demonstrate to European countries readiness and willingness to establish peace. Against the background of such a decision, European countries are likely to plan various joint projects, for example, in the field of security not only in the region but also globally. The attraction of financial investments into these countries may occur as the situation stabilizes and investing in regional projects becomes a profitable option.</p> <p>Resolution of the conflict in the Gaza Strip: the signing of the agreement can allow the parties to reach a compromise on resolving the conflict, obviously with the mediation of third countries. The issue of Palestinian statehood is the main topic of discussion.</p>	<p>Influence of Iran and its proxy groups on the normalization process: the influence of third countries (e.g., Iran) and international actors may hinder the normalization process. External players such as Iran can use the conflict for their own geopolitical goals. Since the establishment of relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States is a negative scenario for the Islamic Republic. Iran aims to create its own coalition together with Arab countries to oppose the United States. In addition, for Iran, Israel is enemy number one, with whom, as it declared, it will fight. Therefore, based on this, Iran may use various means to make this process impossible and derail it.</p> <p>Terrorism and security: threats of terrorism and other security challenges may complicate relations. The need to ensure security may divert resources and attention from the normalization process.</p> <p>Geopolitical changes: unpredictable geopolitical changes may affect stability and interaction between countries. Changes in global politics may impact Saudi-Israeli relations. For example, the results of the 2024 US elections were key where who comes to power and what foreign policy will be pursued in the region.</p> <p>Creation by Iran of an anti-coalition of resistance, including Arab dictatorships: Russia, North Korea, China if a coalition led by the United States is created, there is a high probability that Iran will take a similar step and form a group of dictator countries with shared ideologies and interests to oppose the United States.</p> <p>Rejection by Israel of the possibility of creating a Palestinian State: one of the conditions for normalization is granting privileges to the Palestinian people and creating a Palestinian State. However, the Israeli government may continue to reject the fulfillment of this condition, thereby delaying and complicating the process.</p>

*Pessimistic scenario.* According to this scenario, normalization is expected to be undermined through the interference of Iran. The Islamic Republic tries to create an axis of evil that will oppose the Western world, especially the United States. Since Iran understands that in case of concluding an agreement, a coalition may be created to counter terrorist groups and the actions of the Islamic Republic itself, this becomes an obstacle to the aspirations of the Iranian ayatollah to become an influential

country with its ideological and Muslim beliefs. Under this scenario, Iran may use various hybrid tools to discredit, including Saudi Arabia, among Arab countries, activating its proxy groups and causing a new wave of violence and instability in the region, for example, attacks by Yemeni Houthis on Saudi Arabia's oil refineries. However, to disrupt this process, Iran will act indirectly, as direct confrontation is not in its interests.

Also, an important issue remains Iran's nuclear intimidation to stop this process, since attempts to attack Israel's nuclear facilities have already occurred, and this may become just a trial step toward intimidation. Thus, under this scenario, Iran will try to make significant efforts to disrupt the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel using various, including «dirty», methods.

*Realistic scenario.* In this case, normalization may be formal in nature, meaning the application of minimal diplomatic efforts by both countries. Active bilateral relations are not expected, since for Saudi Arabia it is necessary to maintain a balance between Israel and Iran in order to avoid confrontation with Iran. Under this scenario, partial normalization of relations takes place, which includes economic cooperation and security guarantees. Saudi Arabia and Israel may cooperate in the security field against a common enemy which is Iran. Economic cooperation will be limited due to internal political differences. The Palestinian issue remains unresolved, although the parties may reach temporary compromises. In turn, a bilateral agreement between the USA and Saudi Arabia may be fully realized, despite Iran's attempts to disrupt these agreements.

As a result, partial stabilization of the region is expected, economic benefits will be gained for both countries, although potential risks of conflict remain due to unresolved political issues and Iran's interference in this process.

The results of the probability assessment of each scenario look as follows:

- optimistic scenario, probability of implementation – medium. In this case, the process depends on political will and support from the United States;
- pessimistic scenario, probability of implementation – medium, depends on actions by Iran and its proxy groups;
- realistic scenario, probability of implementation – high, considering current geopolitical conditions and shared security interests. Partial normalization is possible even if the Palestinian issue remains

unresolved, through the conclusion of a bilateral agreement between Riyadh and Washington.

However, taking into account all the options and variables of this process, we lean toward the third scenario – the realistic one.

**Conclusion.** After a thorough analysis of each possible scenario, it becomes clear that to achieve long-term peace and cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel, a comprehensive approach is needed. Given the importance of this issue for regional stability and security, it is necessary to develop clear strategies and recommendations that will help implement the selected scenarios.

Saudi Arabia and Israel are likely to be able to find compromise solutions, but this will not include the issue of the Palestinian people and statehood, due to the position of the Israeli government. In this context, other privileges may be proposed, and cooperation may take on a formal character to maintain a balance between the United States and Iran. For Saudi Arabia, this process is extremely important due to their potential agreement with the United States and their security and military guarantees. The kingdom will try to actively contact Washington so that it exerts pressure and influence on the Israeli government regarding the completion and signing of a potential agreement on the normalization of bilateral relations.

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