

COMMUNICATIVE TECHNOLOGIES OF CONSTRUCTING POLITICAL REALITY

The article aims to conceptualize communicative technologies as a systemic mechanism for constructing political reality and to identify their structural components, functional logic, and effectiveness within a technological approach to political processes. The study is based on a technological approach that interprets political processes as systems of strategically organized instruments of influence. It integrates interdisciplinary insights from political communication, sociology, and cognitive psychology to analyze mechanisms of symbolic impact, meaning production, and audience perception.

The research demonstrates that communicative technologies constitute a coherent, institutionally organized system of symbolic practices that enable the production, reproduction, and transformation of political reality through the management of meanings, images, and collective representations. Their defining feature is resource efficiency, achieved by substituting coercion with symbolic influence, leveraging cognitive and cultural structures of audiences, and ensuring the self-reproduction of constructed meanings.

The study identifies and systematizes key communicative technologies, including a representative promise, political positioning, visual legitimation, nonverbal signaling, solidarization, mobilization of expectations, selective visibility (agenda-setting), emotional resonance, construction of representative roles, and semantic naturalization. Each technology performs a specific function within an integrated system of influence, contributing to legitimacy, mobilization, and stabilization of political power.

Communicative technologies are not auxiliary tools but fundamental mechanisms of political power, shaping political reality as a dynamic symbolic construct. Their effectiveness lies in the integration of cognitive, emotional, and symbolic dimensions of influence. However, their application entails inherent risks, including manipulation, simplification of complex political processes, affective polarization, and erosion of trust.

Keywords: *communication, political power, political technologies, technological approach, legitimation, political reality construction.*

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Комунікативні технології конструювання політичної реальності

Стаття спрямована на теоретичне осмислення комунікативних технологій як системного механізму конструювання політичної реальності, а також на виявлення їх структури, функціональної логіки та ефективності в межах технологічного підходу до аналізу політичних процесів.

Дослідження ґрунтується на технологічному підході, який розглядає політичні процеси як систему цілеспрямовано організованих інструментів впливу. Використано міждисциплінарний підхід із залученням теорій політичної комунікації, соціології та когнітивної психології для аналізу механізмів символічного впливу та конструювання смислів.

Доведено, що комунікативні технології є цілісним, інституційно впорядкованим комплексом практик символічного впливу, які забезпечують продукування, відтворення та трансформацію політичної реальності через управління смислами, образами та колективними уявленнями. Їх ключовою характеристикою є ³⁴⁵ ефективність як здатність досягати політичних результатів за мінімальних ресурсних витрат шляхом заміщення примусу символічним впливом, використання когнітивних структур аудиторії та самовідтворення смислів. Систематизовано основні комунікативні технології: репрезентативної обіцянки, політичного позиціонування, візуальної легітимації, невербального сигналізування, солідаризації, мобілізації очікувань, селективної видимості, емоційного резонансу, конструювання ролі представника та смислової натуралізації. Показано, що вони функціонують як взаємопов'язана система, яка забезпечує легітимацію влади, мобілізацію та стабілізацію політичного порядку.

Комунікативні технології постають як фундаментальний механізм сучасної політики, у межах якого політична реальність формується як динамічний символічний конструкт. Їх ефективність визначається інтеграцією когнітивних, емоційних і символічних компонентів впливу. Водночас їх застосування пов'язане з ризиками маніпуляції, спрощення політичних процесів, афективної поляризації та втрати довіри.

Ключові слова: комунікація, політична влада, політичні технології, технологічний підхід, легітимація, конструювання політичної реальності.

Formulation of the Scientific Problem. The contemporary stage in the development of political processes is characterized by a radical increase in the role of communication as a determining factor in the formation and functioning of power. Political reality is progressively less constituted as an objectively given set of institutions and practices; instead, it acquires the features of a dynamic construct produced, reproduced, and transformed through systematically organized communicative influences. In this context, political power is realized not only through material resources or coercion, but above all through the management of meanings, images, and collective representations, which necessitates theoretical reflection on the corresponding technological mechanisms.

346 — Despite considerable attention to the problems of political communication, fragmentation persists in scholarly discourse regarding the technological dimension of constructing political reality. Existing approaches tend either to focus on particular instruments of influence (propaganda, framing, agenda-setting) or to treat communication as an auxiliary element of politics, without granting it the status of an autonomous mechanism for producing political reality. As a result, questions concerning the systemic nature, internal logic, and effectiveness of communicative technologies as an integrated set of means for constructing the political world remain insufficiently explored.

This problem acquires particular relevance in the context of digitalization, the mediatization of politics, and the growing role of symbolic influence, where the boundaries between reality and its interpretation become increasingly blurred. This creates both new opportunities for the legitimation of power and the mobilization of citizens, as well as risks of manipulative distortion of political reality, the intensification of polarisation, and a decline in the rationality of political choice.

Thus, the scientific problem lies in the need for a comprehensive theoretical understanding of communicative technologies as systematically organized mechanisms for constructing political reality, and in defining their essence, structure, functional capacities, and limitations under contemporary political conditions.

Analysis of Recent Research and Publications. The issue of communicative technologies in the construction of political reality occupies a central place in contemporary interdisciplinary scholarly discourse, integrating contributions from political science, sociology, psychology, and communication theory. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, in their

seminal work *The Social Construction of Reality*, established the conceptual foundations for understanding social (including political) reality as a product of intersubjective communication and symbolic practices (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Walter Lippmann, in *Public Opinion*, substantiated the idea of a pseudo-environment in which the media construct stereotyped images of political reality (Lippmann, 1998). Harold Lasswell, in *The Structure and Function of Communication in Society*, elaborated a model of communication as an instrument of purposeful influence on mass consciousness (Lasswell, 1948). Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, in *The People's Choice*, demonstrated the mediated character of media influence through opinion leaders as key interpreters of political information (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968). Carl Hovland, Arthur Lumsdaine, and Fred Sheffield, in *Experiments on Mass Communication*, proved the significance of cognitive mechanisms of persuasion in the transformation of political attitudes (Hovland, Lumsdaine, and Sheffield, 1949). Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, in *Propaganda & Persuasion*, conceptualised propaganda as a systematic communicative technology for manipulating perception and behaviour (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2014). In *Political Communication in Action: From Theory to Practice*, David L. Helfert systematised both theoretical and applied aspects of political communication, demonstrating its role as a process of strategic meaning-making and influence on the perception of political reality through messages, media, and institutional practices (Helfert, 2018). Max McCombs and Donald Shaw, in their classic work on agenda-setting theory, argued that the media determine not the content of public thought, but the agenda of public thinking, thereby indirectly constructing political reality (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). John Zaller, in *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, showed that the formation of mass political perceptions is the result of the interaction between information flows and individual cognitive filters, which shape the perception of political reality (Zaller, 1992). Tony Schwartz, in *The Responsive Chord*, demonstrated that the effectiveness of political communication is grounded in the resonance of messages with the emotional structures of the audience, thereby facilitating the formation of beliefs and perceptions of political reality (Schwartz, 1974). Drew Westen, in *The Political Brain*, argued that political thinking is predominantly emotional in nature, and thus political reality is constructed through affective mechanisms of influence (Westen, 2007). Chris Mooney, in *The*



Republican Brain, examined cognitive differences in the perception of political information, showing how ideological predispositions influence the construction of alternative political realities (Mooney, 2012). W. Lance Bennett argued that political issues function as symbols through which actors represent and reinterpret reality in ways advantageous to themselves (Bennett, 2012). Richard Perloff, in his studies of political communication, emphasised its role as a persuasive instrument aimed at shaping interpretations of political events and processes (Perloff, 2014). James L. Lipschultz, in *Social Media and Political Communication*, analysed the role of social media as a tool for mobilisation and the formation of political narratives (Lipschultz, 2023). Nur Kholisoh examined persuasion technologies and the role of spin doctors in constructing a positive image of political actors (Kholisoh, 2023). Baljeet Banga revealed the potential of cinema as a medium for the symbolic reproduction of political reality (Banga, 2023). Borys Bulat and Martin Hilbert showed how bots function as instruments of algorithmic influence on political discourse in the online environment (Bulat and Hilbert, 2024). Corneliu Bjola and Ilan Manor, in *The Oxford Handbook of Digital Diplomacy*, substantiated the transformation of political communication under the influence of digital diplomacy (Bjola and Manor, 2024). Melissa Holmes emphasised the role of images and identities in the digital construction of political reality (Holmes, 2024). Ryan Cheek proposed a typology of political technical communication as a genre-structured process (Cheek, 2022). Sidney Coles and Dennis Lane demonstrated the determining role of race and ethnicity as factors in political communication (Coles and Lane, 2023). Stéphanie Boulianne and Anders Larsson proposed a multidimensional model for the comparative analysis of digital political communication (Boulianne and Larsson, 2024). Haider Alrufaiey and Ali Alrikabi examined syntactic structures as instruments of effectiveness in political messaging (Alrufaiey and Alrikabi, 2024). Patrick Donges substantiated the institutional logic of digital media as a factor in the transformation of political communication (Donges, 2022). Jung Kim and Hernan Rojas demonstrated the relationship between political communication, perceptions of polarisation, and political participation (Kim and Rojas, 2024). Siyu Song and Minwei Ai demonstrated the mediated influence of political discussions on citizen mobilisation (Song and Ai, 2024). Bálint Hamrak, Gábor Simonovits, and Ferenc Szűcs modelled elite communication as an equilibrium process of persuasion under conditions of political scandals (Hamarak, Simonovits,

and Szucs, 2024). Thus, the body of these studies provides a foundation for examining communicative technologies as systemic mechanisms for constructing political reality through the management of meanings, interpretations, and the cognitive models of society.

Proceeding from the above, the **objective** of this study is to elucidate the essence of communicative technologies and to identify their specificity as effective means of constructing political reality, as well as to outline the principal mechanisms of their influence on mass consciousness within the framework of the technological approach to the study of political processes.

Presentation of the Main Material. Communicative technologies for constructing political reality constitute a systemically organised, institutionally and strategically ordered complex of methods, practices, and procedures of symbolic influence aimed at the production, consolidation, and reproduction of socially binding interpretations of the political world, through which the acquisition, legitimation, and exercise of power are ensured not by means of direct coercion or the material distribution of resources, but through the management of meanings, images, and collective representations. Their immanent characteristic is efficiency as the economisation of resources, which denotes the capacity to achieve maximal political outcomes (support, loyalty, mobilisation, legitimacy) with minimal expenditure of material, organisational, and coercive resources by virtue of: 1) substituting physical coercion with symbolic influence; 2) utilising the cognitive and cultural structures of the audience; 3) the self-reproduction of constructed meanings within mass consciousness. Consequently, these technologies represent a form of resource-optimised power influence in which communication functions not as an instrument for the transmission of information, but as a multifaceted mechanism for the production of political reality itself.

The methodological foundation of the study is the technological approach, which makes it possible to analyse political processes as a system of purposefully applied instruments of influence for achieving the power-related objectives of political actors. Within this approach, political technologies are examined and classified according to their efficiency, that is, their capacity to secure desired political outcomes under conditions of minimising the expenditure of resources, effort, and time (Vysotskyi, 2023; Vysotskyi and Pavlov, 2025). The application of this criterion makes it possible to distinguish communicative technologies for constructing political reality as a specific type of political technologies whose operation

is directed not at direct coercion or the material distribution of resources, but at the formation and consolidation of dominant interpretations of the political world through symbols, narratives, and images. Accordingly, their differentiation and classification are grounded in mechanisms of influence, modes of meaning production, and the degree of effectiveness in forming socially acceptable representations of political reality.

350 — One of the important communicative technologies is the technology of the representative promise, which consists in the construction of political reality through the articulation of expected future states presented as normatively desirable and attainable, thereby setting the horizons of collective perception of politics. Michael Saward noted that representative claims are claims about what a representative will do (Saward, 2010), indicating the performative nature of the promise as an instrument not of reflection but of producing political reality. The mechanism of this technology is grounded in the symbolic projection of the future through discursively articulated promises, the effectiveness of which is determined by their specificity, trust in the subject, and their repetition in the public sphere. Its significance lies in the mobilization of support and the legitimation of power; however, its limitations manifest in the risk of the devaluation of promises under conditions of their non-fulfillment, which undermines trust and erodes the constructed political reality.

If the technology of the representative promise act shapes perceptions of a desirable future, then the technology of political positioning specifies this perception through the clear delineation of an actor's ideological coordinates within the political space, transforming abstract expectations into recognizable reference points. John Zaller emphasized that people form opinions based on the considerations that are most salient to them (Zaller, 1992), which points to the key role of positioning signals in structuring mass perceptions. The mechanism of this technology consists in the presentation of political "signals" (cues) that enable the audience to interpret an actor's positions rapidly, while its effectiveness is determined by the clarity of the position, its correspondence to audience expectations, and the relevance of the issue context. The significance of the technology of political positioning lies in simplifying complex political reality and ensuring the cognitive orientation of citizens; however, its limitations are manifested in the risk of reducing complex policies to simplified schemes, which may lead to polarisation and the manipulative distortion of reality.

In contrast to the technology of political positioning, which structures perception through verbally articulated semantic reference points, the technology of visual legitimation translates these reference points into the plane of images, where meaning is not so much explained as directly “experienced” by the audience. W. J. T. Mitchell observed that images are not just representations but agents that do things (Mitchell, 2005), thereby emphasising their active role in constructing political reality. The mechanism of this technology consists in the creation and replication of visual images that fix particular interpretations as self-evident, while its effectiveness is determined by the emotional intensity of the image, its media reproducibility, and its capacity for the symbolic condensation of complex meanings. The significance of the technology of visual legitimation lies in the rapid formation of legitimacy and mass recognisability; however, its limitations manifest in the simplification of political reality and dependence on the context of interpretation, which opens up possibilities for manipulative distortions.

Whereas the technology of visual legitimation is grounded in the creation of images, the next level of communicative influence is associated with the technology of non-verbal signalling, which is realised through bodily-behavioural acts, and meaning is conveyed directly through action, bypassing extended representation. In this context, Erving Goffman emphasised that individuals give off expressions that others can treat as symptomatic of the actor (Goffman, 1959), underscoring that non-verbal signals function as indicators of political position. The mechanism of this technology consists in the use of gestures, behavioural acts, and symbolic actions (handshakes, participation in events, demonstrative gestures) that encode political meanings without direct verbalisation. The effectiveness of the technology of non-verbal signalling is determined by the visibility of the signal, the unambiguity of its interpretation, and its correspondence to the context. The significance of the technology of non-verbal signalling lies in its capacity to form trust and identification rapidly and intuitively; however, its limitations are manifested in its high dependence on audience interpretation and the risk of ambiguous or even contrary readings of such signals.

Extending the logic of non-verbal signalling, the technology of solidarisation elevates individual symbolic gestures to the level of collectively significant actions, through which a political actor not merely sends a signal but demonstrates their inclusion in a shared experience and

struggle. In this sense, Murray Edelman noted that political actions are largely symbolic acts that evoke and reinforce shared meanings (Edelman, 1964), thereby emphasising the integrative potential of such actions. The mechanism of this technology consists in the public alignment with group practices (protests, marches, rituals), which encodes belonging to a particular community, while its effectiveness is determined by the authenticity of participation, the degree of audience identification, and media visibility. The significance of the technology of solidarisation lies in the construction of collective identities and the legitimisation of political actors through a “community of action”; however, its limitations manifest in the risk of symbolic superficiality and the possibility that such acts may be perceived as instrumental or manipulative.

352 — Whereas the technology of solidarisation consolidates an already existing community through the demonstration of belonging, the technology of expectation mobilisation is directed at the anticipatory formation of perceptions of desired actions and outcomes that are yet to be realised. In this context, Robert Entman emphasised that “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient” (Entman, 1993), which indicates the capacity of communication to direct audience expectations. The mechanism of this technology consists in emphasising particular problems, scenarios, and solutions as priorities, thereby structuring the horizon of citizens’ expectations. The effectiveness of the technology of mobilisation is determined by its correspondence to public sentiment, the intensity of repetition, and the emotional engagement of the audience. Its significance lies in its capacity to activate political participation and legitimise future actions of power; however, its limitations manifest in the risk of inflated expectations, the gap between which and actual policy may lead to frustration and delegitimation.

Whereas the technology of expectation mobilisation determines what citizens are to expect from politics, the technology of selective visibility determines which elements of reality enter the field of their perception at all, thereby establishing the boundaries of possible political thinking. In this sense, Maxwell McCombs emphasised that the media may not be successful in telling people what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling their audiences what to think about (McCombs, 2004). The mechanism of this technology consists in the selection, hierarchisation, and repeated reproduction of particular topics, events, and acts, which ensures their dominance in public discourse. The effectiveness of the technology of

selective visibility is determined by the level of media control, the frequency of exposure, and its correspondence to the informational demands of the audience. Its significance lies in the formation of the agenda as the structural framework of political reality; however, its limitations manifest in dependence on alternative channels of information and the risk of a loss of trust in the event of overtly manipulative selection.

Whereas the technology of selective visibility determines which topics become objects of attention, the technology of emotional resonance determines how precisely these topics are experienced and consolidated in consciousness, endowing them with affective intensity. In this context, George Lakoff emphasised that “frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world” (Lakoff, 2004, 10), underscoring that the effectiveness of political communication largely depends on its capacity to activate emotionally saturated cognitive frames. The mechanism of this technology consists in combining semantic constructions with emotional triggers (fear, hope, pride), thereby ensuring deeper consolidation of interpretations. The effectiveness of the technology of emotional resonance is determined by the intensity of the emotional response, the capacity for identification, and the repetition of influence. Its significance lies in strengthening mobilisation potential and stabilising political beliefs; however, its limitations manifest in the risk of affective polarisation, a decline in the rationality of political choice, and increased vulnerability to manipulation.

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Whereas the technology of emotional resonance ensures the affective consolidation of political meanings, the technology of constructing the role of the representative translates these meanings into stable models of expected behaviour, through which the actor becomes recognisable as a “bearer” of a particular type of representation. In this context, Hanna Pitkin notes that representation means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them (Pitkin, 1967), emphasising the normative foundation of the representative role. The mechanism of this technology consists in the consistent reproduction of particular behavioural and discursive patterns that form in citizens’ consciousness a stable perception of the functions and limits of a political actor’s action. The effectiveness of the technology of constructing the role of the representative is determined by the consistency of the role, the public confirmation of actions, and the level of societal recognition. Its significance lies in stabilising political expectations and legitimising power through the predictability of

behaviour; however, its limitations manifest in the risk of role rigidity and the loss of adaptability to changing political contexts.

When the role of the representative is stabilised through repeated patterns of action, the next step is their transformation into a “natural order of things”, which is precisely what the technology of semantic naturalisation ensures. In this sense, Roland Barthes noted that “myth transforms history into nature”, thereby emphasising the mechanism by which socially constructed meanings are converted into self-evident ones (Barthes, 1972). The mechanism of this technology consists in the constant repetition and institutionalisation of particular interpretations, as a result of which they are perceived as non-alternative and non-ideological. The effectiveness of the technology of semantic naturalisation is determined by the duration of reproduction, the absence of competing narratives, and the level of their integration into everyday communication. Its significance lies in the deep consolidation of political reality as a “given”; however, its limitations manifest in the possibility of its deconstruction upon the emergence of alternative interpretations or crisis events that expose the artificiality of such meanings.

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Conclusions. As a result of the conducted study, it has been established those communicative technologies are not an auxiliary element of the political process, but its fundamental mechanism through which the production, structuring, and reproduction of political reality take place. Under contemporary conditions, politics appears not as a set of objectively given institutions, but as a dynamic symbolic construct formed in the process of systematically organised communicative influences aimed at managing meanings, images, and collective representations.

It has been substantiated those communicative technologies for constructing political reality should be understood as a holistic, institutionally ordered complex of methods and practices of symbolic influence that ensures the achievement of political objectives through resource-optimised mechanisms of influence on mass consciousness. Their key characteristic is efficiency as the capacity to achieve the legitimation of power, mobilisation, and support with minimal use of coercive and material resources, which is achieved by substituting physical coercion with symbolic influence, relying on the cognitive structures of the audience, and ensuring the self-reproduction of constructed meanings.

The study has demonstrated that communicative technologies function as an interconnected system in which each individual technology

performs a specific function in the process of constructing political reality. In particular, the technology of the representative promise act shapes perceptions of a desirable future and ensures the mobilisation of support; the technology of political positioning structures the perception of political actors; the technologies of visual legitimation and non-verbal signalling translate meanings into the plane of images and actions; the technology of solidarisation constructs collective identities; the technology of expectation mobilisation sets the horizons of political thinking; the technology of selective visibility determines the agenda; the technology of emotional resonance ensures the affective consolidation of meanings; the technology of constructing the role of the representative stabilises expectations regarding political behaviour; and the technology of semantic naturalisation transforms constructed interpretations into “self-evident” reality.

It has been demonstrated that the effectiveness of these technologies is determined by their capacity to integrate cognitive, emotional, and symbolic components of influence, thereby ensuring the deep consolidation of political meanings in mass consciousness. At the same time, it has been established that each of these technologies possesses internal limitations associated with the risks of manipulative distortion of reality, the simplification of complex political processes, the formation of inflated expectations, affective polarisation, and the loss of trust in the event of a discrepancy between constructed meanings and actual political practices.

Thus, communicative technologies emerge as a key instrument of contemporary political power, ensuring its legitimation and reproduction through the management of interpretations of social reality. At the same time, their use brings to the fore the necessity of critically reflecting on the limits and consequences of such influence, particularly under conditions of digitalisation and the mediatization of politics, where both the potential for effective governance of political processes and the risks of manipulative construction of political reality are increasing. Prospects for further research are associated with the analysis of the transformation of communicative technologies in the digital environment, as well as with the development of mechanisms to ensure their transparency and compliance with democratic standards.

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