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DIGITALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A FACTOR IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINE

This article details Ukraine's strategy for implementing the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the context of countering the Russian Federation's hybrid information manipulation in the cyber and telecommunications network of the Internet, which threatens global stability, civil egalitarianism, constructive cooperation, inclusiveness, and peaceful coexistence. It highlights the results of the activities of Ukrainian authorities to ensure the functioning of international agencies «Stop Russia Channel», «Vox Ukraine», «Euromaidan Press», «Internews-Ukraine», «Lets Data», «TEXTY», «Inform Napalm», «Chesno», «Ukraine Crisis Media Centre» (UCMC), «Stop Fake», «Vox Check», «Detector Media», «Fact Check-Ukraine» and «Gra Sliv», which are integrated into the scientific and educational programmes of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to diversify society's competencies in refuting Russian disinformation. A comprehensive analysis of the regulatory and legal framework for the implementation by the Ukrainian authorities of the instructions of Goals 4, 10, 16, and 17 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in terms of optimising the digital infrastructure for debunking Moscow's disinformation, with the aim of reforming transnational dialogue on the UN's doctrines of civilisational virtual tolerance, equality, high levels of education, mutual rational benefit and pragmatic inter-state cooperation. The results of the implementation of joint projects between Ukraine, the EU and NATO within the framework of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to update the cybersecurity network and filter digital content in the media, repositories, social applications and

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electronic communication services from fictitious discrediting campaigns by the Russian Federation with the exploitation of «FotoForensics», «Skeptive», «Lazy Truth», «Rev Eye Reverse Image Search», «Trooclick», «Truth Goggles», «Image Edited?», «Setting the Record Straight» and «Who stole my pictures».

Key words: *disinformation hybrid operations, UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), digital propaganda, manipulation, media, electronic communication systems, refutation, international image, destructive influence.*

Цифровізація міжнародних відносин як чинник сталого розвитку України

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У даній статті детально викладено стратегію реалізації Україною пунктів Цілей сталого розвитку ООН (SDG) в контексті протидії інформаційно-гібридним маніпуляціям пропаганди РФ у кібернетичній і телекомунікаційній мережі Інтернет, що загрожує глобальній стабільності, громадянському егалі-таризму, конструктивному співробітництву, інклюзивності та мирному співіснуванню. Висвітлено результати діяльності органів влади України для забезпечення функціонування міжнародних агенцій «Stop Russia Channel», «Vox Ukraine», «Euromaidan Press», «Інтерньюз-Україна», «Lets Data», «ТЕКСТИ», «Inform Naralm», «Чесно», «Ukraine Crisis Media Center» (UCMC), «Stop Fake», «VoxCheck», «Детектор медіа», «Fact Check-Ukraine» та «Гра слів», інтегрованих до науково-освітніх програм Цілей сталого розвитку ООН (SDG) з диверсифікації компетенцій суспільства в області спростування дез-інформаційних матеріалів Росії. Комплексно проаналізовано нормативно-правовий фундамент втілення владою України інструкцій Цілі №4, 10, 16, 17 Цілей сталого розвитку ООН (SDG) у вимірі оптимізації цифрової інфраструктури розвінчання дезінформації Москви, з метою реформування транснаціонального діалогу на передбачених ООН доктринах цивілізаційної віртуальної толерантності, рівноправності, високого рівня освіченості, обопільної раціональної вигідності та прагматичності міждержавної кооперації. Охарактеризовано підсумки імплементації колегіальних проєктів України, ЄС та НАТО в рамках Цілей сталого розвитку (SDG) для оновлення мережі кібербезпеки та фільтрації цифрового контенту ЗМІ, репозиторіїв, соціальних додатків і сервісів електронної комунікації від фіктивних дискредитаційних кампаній РФ методом експлуатації концентрів «Foto Forensics», «Skeptive», «Lazy Truth», «Rev

Eye Reverse Image Search», «Trooclick», «Truth Goggles», «Image Edited?», «Setting the Record Straight» та «Who stole my pictures».

Ключові слова: дезінформаційні гібридні операції, Цілі сталого розвитку ООН (SDG), цифрова пропаганда, маніпуляції, ЗМІ, електронні комунікаційні системи, спростування, міжнародний імідж, деструктивний вплив.

Formulation of the scientific problem and its significance. With the rapid development of information technologies, digital data transfer systems, and remote communication, the Russian government is making adjustments to its interventionist foreign policy strategy in Ukraine. The authorities of the Russian Federation are allocating technical, financial and human resources to disseminate biased messages that discredit the Ukrainian administrative apparatus without publishing substantiated evidence, exclusively in electronic and television formats, thus laying the foundation for digital propaganda. This strategy gives preference to reaching a large audience in the post-Soviet states, the Global South and post-industrial technocratic countries, which leads to a decline in support for Ukraine in its military confrontation with the Russian Federation. Thus, in order to counteract these manipulations by Moscow within the framework of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), it is necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of the narratives, as well as the methodology for spreading disinformation in cyberspace or through television media. In order to accomplish this task, the Ukrainian authorities and UN structural departments will acquire the resources to effectively publicly debunk false evidence prepared by Russia by publishing advisory materials and explanations in the media, official press releases and speeches by government officials, which will precede the formation of a national model of counter-information activities.

Analysis of recent studies on this issue. A multi-vector analysis of disinformation statements by the Russian Federation published by Russian media and foreign branches of these media holdings with the aim of spreading manipulative information about Ukraine and violating the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is carried out on the basis of academic works by researchers such as Palamarchuk 2024; Nikolaets 2023; Gorun 2023; Maksymets, Vivsiana 2023; Rozumets, Shkurov, Golik 2024; At the same time, the identification of mechanisms for scaling up Russian propaganda to discredit Kyiv using international telecommunications

services that operate with a strong image, as well as the study of public awareness algorithms used by Ukraine to counter a range of false Russian claims, by adhering to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), based on the works of Drapak 2023; Markova 2020; Petrenko, Nazarenko 2024; Pernik 2014; Tykhomirova 2023; Kravchuk 2023. Research into the legislative and regulatory criteria for Ukraine's activities to support the sterility, reliability and inclusiveness of electronic public data, in accordance with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and countering Russian disinformation, is based on the works of Vdovenko 2023; NSDC Resolution 2024; CMU Order 2023.

Formulation of the article's purpose and objectives. Fundamentally study and catalogue the theoretical complex of Russian propaganda theses directed against Ukraine in the electronic digital space. The urgency of identifying Kyiv's policy in the implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which provide for the elimination of Russia's destructive influence on the Ukrainian and foreign digital social and information network for the transfer of large volumes of data, is declared.

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— **Presentation of the main material.** It should be noted that the tactic of broadcasting false digital accusations against the Ukrainian government is based on the exploitation of the extensive network of Russian television channels, which expanded their broadcasting territory after the collapse of the USSR.

Thus, the vast majority of digital propaganda and information manipulation aimed at reducing the level of support for Ukraine from civil society in foreign countries is disseminated through Russian government television channels and media services, including the «Interfax International News Agency», «Rossiya Segodnya», «Pervy», «ZVEZDA NEWS», «Tsarograd», «Zvezda», «Rossiya-1», «Wargonzo», «Russkoe Slovo», «Glavnye Novosti», «Vesti Nedeli», the «Federal News Agency» (RIA FAN), the «Russian International Information Agency» (RIA Novosti), «Russia Today» (RT), «Interregional Information Centre Izvestia», «Solovyov Live», «NTV/NTV Mir», «Evening Moscow», «STS», «REN TV», «Antifascist», «Russian Information Agency TASS», «Lenta.ru», «Russia 24», «TNT», «Komsomolskaya Pravda», «TV-3» (Nikolaets, 2023, 147).

In order to counter the identified threats to Ukraine's national security, following the Russian Federation's intervention on 24 February 2022, the structures of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (MFA), headed by Dmytro Kuleba from 4 March 2020 to 5 September 2024, intensified

cooperation with EU countries and UN General Assembly (UNGA) institutions to optimise the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These initiatives were organised to ban the broadcasting of Russian media content from the Russia Today holding company in the comprehensive educational network of Latvia, Poland, France, Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Germany, Lithuania, Moldova, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the information system of the Commonwealth of Nations consortium members (Drapak, 2023, 4-5).

The listed TV channels include «RT UK», «RT Spanish», «TV Center International», «RT Balkan», «Sputnik», «RT Germany», «RTR Planeta», «RT America», «RT Documentary», «RT France», «RT Arabic», «RT English», and «RT International» (Mezhenska, 2024, 136).

In addition, as a result of the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the authorities in Kyiv significantly increased the amount of financial allocations provided to media companies, which together created jobs for 300,000 people. These individuals are involved in the functioning of the Institute for Regional Press Development, which presented the service repository «Beyond the News: I Don't Believe the Words», «Media Detector», «Kharkiv Crisis Information Centre», «Internews-Ukraine», which created the «Ukraine World» department, «Word Game», «StopFake», «Data Journalism Agency», «Euromaidan Press», «Chesno», «Ukraine-2050», «TEXTY», «Centre for Countering Disinformation» (CCD), «Vox Ukraine», which founded the «Vox Check» initiative, «Information Forces of Ukraine», «Ukrainian Reformers Team», which developed the «Fact Check-Ukraine platform», «Journalistic Organisation of the MIG Newspaper», «Stop Russia Channel», «Lets Data», «Doslovno», «Inform Napalm», «Ukraine Crisis Media Centre» (UCMC) (Markova, 2020, 466-467).

The task of these organisations, which target Ukrainian audiences and the populations of other countries, was interpreted as the implementation of Goals 4, 10, 16, and 17 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which argued for the need to refute Russia's disinformation campaigns aimed at promoting false statements about the government, opinion leaders or heads of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with the aim of creating a negative international image of Kyiv. Moreover, the «Ukraine NOW» service, created on 10 May 2018 by «Banda Agency», and the «War.Ukraine» association, founded on 2 March 2022 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, perform an identical function (Petrenko, Nazarenko 2024, 31).

The institutions were registered within the framework of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to publish reports on diagnostic surveys of Ukrainian citizens on socio-political and trade-economic topics, analyse the views and positions of categories of the population affected by the military conflict, publish data on the state of hostilities between the Russian Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as broadcasting nationwide news stories using nine foreign language systems (Mezhenska, 2024, 136).

170 — Moreover, in order to scale up the resources of administrative specialised agencies and activists in the segment of limiting the destructive influence of Russian disinformation channels on international and Ukrainian audiences, the Ukrainian authorities approved a list of regulatory and legal acts that confirmed Kyiv's commitment to implementing the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the field of cyber information security. Thus, on 3 March 2022, Valerii Fedorovych Zaluzhnyi, who served as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from 27 July 2021 to 8 February 2024, issued Directive No. 73 «On the organisation of cooperation between the Armed Forces of Ukraine, other components of the defence forces and representatives of the media during the period of martial law». In addition, on 12 March 2022, the departments of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU) approved Resolution No. 263 «Certain issues of ensuring the functioning of information and communication systems, electronic communication systems, public electronic registers under martial law» (Vdovenko, 2023, 67-68).

It should also be noted that on 12 June 2022, legislative institutions ratified Law of Ukraine No. 2265-IX «On the prohibition of propaganda of the Russian Nazi totalitarian regime, armed aggression of the Russian Federation as a terrorist state against Ukraine, and symbols of the military invasion of the Russian Nazi totalitarian regime in Ukraine». At the same time, the administrative apparatus sanctioned the Law of Ukraine «On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine «On Electronic Communications» regarding improving the efficiency of the organisation of the work of electronic communications network and/or service providers in conditions of martial law» on 5 May 2022. Simultaneously, on 1 April 2022, members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU) submitted for consideration the Law of Ukraine «On Amendments to Article 114 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine regarding the improvement of liability for the unauthorised dissemination of information about means of countering the armed aggres-

sion of the Russian Federation», and on 1 December 2022, they developed the Law of Ukraine «On the mutual recognition of qualified electronic trust services and the implementation of European Union legislation in the field of electronic identification», and on 7 March 2022, they published the Law of Ukraine «On Amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine regarding the strengthening of liability for crimes against the foundations of Ukraine's national security under martial law». Moreover, on 16 March 2022, the Law of Ukraine «On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding the Strengthening of Criminal Liability for the Production and Distribution of Prohibited Information Products» and the Resolution 436 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (CCU) «Justification, recognition as lawful, denial of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, glorification of its participants» were ratified, and on 31 March 2023, deputies of the VRU adopted the Law of Ukraine «On Media» (Vdovenko, 2023, 72-75).

However, the fundamental pact that established the main mechanisms of the Ukrainian authorities in the context of the implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the reduction of the effectiveness of Russian disinformation messages in the national media industry, as well as in the digital data networks of other countries, is considered to be the resolution of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDC) «On Neutralising Threats to State Information Security» dated 18 March 2022, as well as CMU Order No. 272 «On Approval of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Information Security Strategy for the Period until 2025», presented to the public on 30 March 2023 (CMU, 2023, No. 272-r).

Based on this, the signing of congruent draft laws and resolutions has provided private organisations and administrative institutions in Ukraine with a range of preferences for the effective implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the context of ensuring digital information hygiene, social egalitarianism, obtaining unbiased qualifications and knowledge, as well as inter-state equality. They ensure the modernisation of dialogue with foreign states to refute the Russian Federation's disinformation operations directed against Ukrainian citizens, as well as civilian users of the electronic cyber network of EU and NATO counterparts. It should be noted that the key line of Ukraine's transnational communication with actors in international relations in terms of the global implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

is identified as the intergovernmental association «The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence» (NATO Strat Com COE), founded on 1 September 2014 in Riga after a negotiation summit organised as a result of lobbying for this process by Andris Bērziņš, who served as President of the Republic of Latvia from 8 July 2011 to 8 July 2015 (Maksymets and Vivsiana 2023, 76).

At the declarative level, the competence of the NATO Strat Com COE included the implementation of individual programmes of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to improve the quality of tactical skills and specialisation of the armed forces personnel of the North Atlantic Alliance countries in several segments. These included forecasting hybrid digital interventions by individual countries or terrorist groups in commercial, social, administrative, and military-political cyber networks for the exchange of public data, with the aim of spreading propaganda and manipulative false statements directed against individual countries, persons, infrastructure enterprises, as well as ethno-national and financial-industrial associations.

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— Moreover, the NATO StratCom COE declared its goal to be the creation of the necessary mechanisms for comprehensive international cooperation between NATO countries and foreign entities under the mandate of the UN. This process was carried out for the purpose of collegial analysis of trends and prospects for the diversification of the transcontinental digital system for the transfer of large volumes of information materials, public cloud platforms, repositories, virtual scientific and educational applications, forums, and remote interaction services. This led to an increase in the effectiveness of diplomatic clarification by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) departments of the criteria for the international strategy of this bloc of states, and has also intensified the optimisation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) algorithms to counter hybrid campaigns promoting manipulative evidence and false myths on the part of authoritarian countries represented by the Russian Federation, North Korea, Iran and China (NATO Strat Com COE).

It should be noted that Ukraine's partnership with this association in debunking disinformation attacks by the Russian Federation, which dehumanise the government, army corps and volunteers of Ukraine in the eyes of the state's citizens and foreign audiences, is based on the documents «NATO Cyber Defence Policy» and «NATO-Ukraine Trust Fund on Cyber Defence» (NATO-UKRAINE TF CD), approved at the NATO

summit in Wales on 4-5 September 2014, the «Strategy for Countering Hybrid Threats» pact, approved in 2015, the document «NATO's Defensive Mandate», signed on 8-9 July 2016 at the NATO Warsaw Summit by Jean-Claude Juncker, who served as President of the European Commission from 1 November 2014 to 30 November 2019, Jens Stoltenberg, who served as NATO Secretary General from 1 October 2014 to 1 October 2024, and Donald Franciszek Tusk, who served as President of the European Council from 1 December 2014 to 30 November 2019. Moreover, the regulatory and legal foundation for cooperation between Kyiv and Brussels to expose Russia's electronic propaganda narratives and protect humanitarian, scientific, academic and cyber security in the context of implementing the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is reinforced by the Technical Arrangement between the «NATO Computer Incident Response Capability» (NCIRC) and the «Computer Emergency Response Team – European Union» (CERT-EU), signed on 10 February 2016 between NATO, the «European Network» and «Information Security Agency» (ENISA), the European Commission and the «European External Action Service» (EEAS), and the legal provision «Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy», ratified on 14 June 2021 at the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels (Pernik, 2014, 4-6).

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A fundamental stage in Ukraine's integration into NATO and the EU in the context of compliance with recommendations 4, 10, 16, and 17 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the reduction of Moscow's privileges to broadcast disinformation stories about the socio-administrative and military-strategic complex of Kyiv in the media industry of European countries is characterised by the signing of a group of agreements. These include the «Memorandum of Agreement», approved on 17 January 2022 by «The NATO Communications and Information Agency» (NCI Agency) and delegates of the administrative apparatus of Ukraine, as well as the «NATO Cyber Attack Rapid Response Program» resolution, agreed on 29 June 2022 – 30 June 2022, which declared the need for significant optimisation and improvement of the «NATO-Ukraine Trust Fund on Cyber Defence» (NATO-UKRAINE TF CD) programme (Maksymets, and Vivsiana 2023, 77-78).

The described documents provided cost-effective conditions for the transfer of currency resources and investments from Brussels to Ukraine as part of cooperation on the implementation of the information and humanitarian directives of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

NATO and EU configurations invested in initiatives to standardise the trajectory of progress in Ukraine's cyber telecommunications network, remote mobile communications, and electronic data privacy protection systems, in line with the unified legislative structure of the European Union. As a result, the Ukrainian and NATO authorities, with the support of the relevant EU agencies, the «European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) Task Force on Disinformation on the War in Ukraine» and the «East Strat Com Task Force», have stepped up funding for public awareness initiatives aimed at publishing information messages for citizens of Ukraine and other European states with the aim of providing instructions for the competent identification of propaganda manipulations and biased news stories from the Russian Federation in the virtual information and communication space (Tykhomirova, 2023, 94-95).

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Moreover, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the European Commission, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the Ukrainian government on the urgency of scaling up the computerised infrastructure of certain UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to expose Russian disinformation against Ukraine is based on the principles of the «2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats». This statistical and analytical study revealed that the relevant departments of the «European External Action Service» (EEAS) exposed 750 cases of digital promotion of pre-emptively biased information materials and propaganda campaigns between 1 December 2022 and 30 November 2023. In 21% of cases, these projects specialised in unfounded accusations against Ukraine of offences that were not confirmed by foreign state authorities or international autonomous OSINT services. Thus, the materials presented gave Kyiv the status of a leading vector for the functioning of the Russian Federation's special services engaged in implementing Moscow's disinformation strategies.

Based on this, the authorities of Ukraine, the EU, NATO and UN committees noted the relevance of accelerating the acquisition of skills by the public to filter content on the Internet and social services, in order to construct a subjective political point of view based on critical thinking and complex analytics, which was declared one of the key tasks of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) (Palamarchuk, 2024, 8).

At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities, in cooperation with the UN, European allies and the US, drew the attention of the international community to the priority of using digital applications such as «Truth Gog-

gles», «TinEye», «Skeptive», «Setting the Record Straight», «Rev Eye Reverse Image Search», «Foto Forensics», «Trooclick», «Who stole my pictures», «Lazy Truth», and «Image Edited?». These applications have been classified as priority utilities for protecting the hygiene of the virtual information environment within the framework of the implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These applications publish reliable, verified information about Ukraine's socio-political, humanitarian, trade and economic complex, as well as the current state of transnational cooperation. These digital repositories display official press releases and speeches by government representatives that refute the narratives of manipulative propaganda content and provide users with intellectual resources and expertise for hardware and software identification of fake disinformation photos and videos (Rozumets, Shkurov, and Golik 2024, 202).

In addition, as a result of the launch of these electronic applications and educational platforms, Ukraine's administrative apparatus identified and eliminated 93 «Facebook» forums, 500 «YouTube» accounts, 1,529 «Telegram» information resources, 1,050 «TikTok» public pages, and 426 «Instagram» profiles that published false statements and information manipulations about the socio-political, administrative, and military-strategic situation in Ukraine (Horun, 2023, 125).

As a result, the authorities of Ukraine, NATO countries and UN entities have gained the opportunity to effectively counteract the international influence on civilian audiences exerted by modern Russian disinformation programmes aimed at discrediting Kyiv's domestic and transnational activities. The task of congruent digital services is to fulfil the information and communication categories of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the segment of debunking propaganda statements spread in the global media sphere. The outlined electronic platforms accused a list of biased news stories and reviews published by global holdings such as «The Guardian», «Welt», «The Wall Street Journal», «The Hill», «The New York Times», «The Times», «ABC News», «Business Insider», «The Washington Post», «Politico» and «Forbes», authored by journalists associated with Moscow. The processes described were implemented to reduce international monetary, financial, military, technical, political, diplomatic and social support for Ukraine from NATO members and Kyiv's allies (National Security and Defence Council, 13.05. – 19.05.2024).

Thus, by 2025, the information resources of Ukraine and NATO countries had effectively implemented points 4, 10, 16 and 17 of the UN Sus-

tainable Development Goals (SDGs), thereby pre-emptively neutralising Russia's ability to conduct large-scale virtual expansion of a group of propaganda campaigns against Ukraine by refuting Moscow's disinformation in the media of the United States and the European Union. At the same time, the Russian Federation's manipulative narratives have incorporated claims about the construction of radiological weapons of mass destruction with ionising radiation on the territory of Ukraine, produced on the basis of resources from the Centralised Spent Fuel Storage Facility (CSFSF) located on the territory of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) (Horun, 2023, 122).

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Moreover, components of the media industry in Ukraine and partner countries have organised counter-information programmes in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to refute Russia's propaganda claims in «Maidan-3», which appeal to the urgent need to organise rallies in Ukraine against authoritarian rule. At the same time, the identified hybrid strategy of the Russian Federation is being implemented with the use of international telecommunications conglomerates and news materials, such as «White House Worries Russia's Momentum Is Changing Trajectory of Ukraine War», published on 14 May 2024 by The New York Times, «Zelensky's chief aide flexes power, irks critics – and makes no apologies», published on 18 May 2024 by The Washington Post, and «Volodymyr Zelensky's five-year term ends on 20 May», published on 16 May 2024 by The Economist. The reason for these revolutionary processes is argued to be the urgent need to eliminate the threat of the cancellation of the Ukrainian presidential election due to the continuation of hostilities after the end of Volodymyr Zelensky's jurisdiction and official term as head of state on 20 May 2024 (Kravchuk, 2023, 237).

In addition, relevant state institutions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and public associations of Ukraine, in coordination with foreign associations, UN committees and partner countries, exposed and refuted the Russian Federation's disinformation project «Istanbul-2» in 2024. It involved posting data on digital social networks and international media outlets highlighting Brussels and Washington's approval of the rationality of signing a peace treaty between Ukraine and Russia, which is exclusively in Moscow's geopolitical interests. Under this pact, Kyiv would have to exclude the territories of Luhansk, Kherson, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia regions and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea from the Constitution of Ukraine. These provisions were also combined with the denunciation of

Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration course, a reduction in the quantitative parameters of armoured firepower complexes and means of transporting combat personnel, as well as a limitation of the number of personnel in the Armed Forces of Ukraine to 83,500 servicemen (National Security and Defence Council, 08.04 – 14.04.2024).

Conclusion. To summarise the above, it must be noted that the combination of the Russian Federation's military-political interventionist actions with the spread of disinformation hybrid operations narratives directed against Ukraine is the foundation of Moscow's current expansionist doctrine. This strategy is based on creating threats to the global implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which establish the need to model social equality, respect for the information sovereignty of international relations counterparties, inclusiveness, transparency and verifiability of digital data, as well as the provision of scientific and educational services that have not undergone metamorphosis due to the country's geopolitical activities. To implement these intentions in the network of digital transnational cooperation, the Russian administrative apparatus uses a list of federal propaganda media, which delegates the possibility of creating mechanisms for control and opportunistic transformation of the political views of the population of different states, violating the norms and standards approved in paragraphs 4, 10, 16, and 17 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

At the same time, Moscow also discredits Ukraine by exploiting foreign branches of state media services and foreign affiliated journalists. They publish manipulative statements as part of channel broadcasts, as well as in physical and digital newspaper editions of international telecommunications publications with a high image and brand, which generates the problem of the public audience's unquestioning perception of the specified information due to their trust in global news tools.

Effectively countering the impact of Russia's digital propaganda attacks remains a fundamental focus of cooperation between Kyiv, Brussels and UN agencies. These attacks are directed at Ukrainian citizens and civilian representatives of intercultural cooperation actors united within the framework of institutions for collegial adherence to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The aim of the attacks is to dehumanise the Ukrainian government, armed forces and volunteers. Based on this, the further diversification of the partnership between Ukraine, the EU and NATO in the field of cyberspace filtration, as well as countering the Rus-

sian Federation's disinformation campaigns, is characterised by the prerequisite of stabilising the European security model and limiting Moscow's transcontinental socio-educational, cybernetic-digital and territorial aggression.

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